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Business processes under authorization control are sets of coordinated activities subject
to a security policy stating which agent can access which resource. Their behavior is
diﬃcult to predict due to the complex and unexpected interleaving of different execution
ﬂows within the process. Serious ﬂaws may thus go undetected and manifest themselves
only after deployment. For this reason, business processes are being considered a new,
promising application domain for formal methods and model checking techniques in
particular. In this paper we show that action-based languages provide a rich and natural
framework for the formal speciﬁcation of and automated reasoning about business
processes under authorization constraints. We do this by discussing the application of
the action language C to the speciﬁcation of a business process from the banking domain
that is representative of an important class of business processes of practical relevance.
Furthermore we show that a number of reasoning tasks that arise in this context (namely
checking whether the control ﬂow together with the security policy meets the expected
security properties, building a security policy for the given business process under given
security requirements, and ﬁnding an allocation of tasks to agents that guarantees the
completion of the business process) can be carried out automatically using the Causal
Calculator CCalc. We also compare C with the prominent speciﬁcation language used in
model-checking.1
© 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Business processes under authorization control are sets of coordinated activities subject to a security policy stating
which agent can access which resource. The order according to which the activities must be executed is given by the work-
ﬂow, which is usually speciﬁed by means of graphical notations, e.g., Petri nets [2], Business Process Modelling Notation
(BPMN) [3]. The speciﬁcation of the policy is usually given in terms of a basic access control model (e.g., the Role-Based Ac-
cess Control (RBAC) model [4]) possibly enriched with features providing the ﬂexibility required by the application domain
(e.g., delegation) and mechanisms that are necessary to meet mandatory regulations (e.g., separation of duty constraints).
The behavior of business processes is diﬃcult to predict due to the complex and unexpected interleaving of different exe-
cution ﬂows within the process. Serious ﬂaws (either in the control ﬂow or in the security policy, or in both) may thus go
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simple inspection of the system, or by simulation, business processes are being considered a new, promising application do-
main for formal methods and model checking techniques in particular. In previous works, e.g., [5,6], it has been shown that
model checking can be proﬁtably used for the automatic analysis of business processes, and a number of techniques have
been designed to alleviate the state explosion problem, see, e.g., [7]. Yet, their applicability to business processes appears to
be problematic as state-of-the-art model checkers—being geared to the analysis of hardware designs—require the system to
be modeled as the composition of independent (yet interacting) sub-components. On the contrary, business processes and
the associated security policy are best viewed as a collection of actions subject to a given workﬂow pattern and a set of
independent access control rules.
Reasoning about actions and change is a long standing research area in Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI), and several languages
for knowledge representation [8] (e.g., logic programming [9,10] and action languages [11–13]) and automated reasoning
tools (e.g., smodels [14], DLV [15], DLVK [16], CCalc [17]) have been put forward. In this paper we show that the action-
based language C [18] provides a rich and natural speciﬁcation framework for supporting formal declarative speciﬁcations
of business processes under authorization constraints and that a number of reasoning tasks that arise in this context can
be automated by using the Causal Calculator CCalc. The effectiveness of the proposed approach is illustrated by using C
to specify the Loan Origination Process (LOP), a business process from the banking domain that is representative of an
important class of business processes of practical relevance as it features many aspects that frequently occur in practice:
non-trivial interplay between the control ﬂow and the security policy, sophisticated access-control policies, events and tasks
with nondeterministic, conditional and indirect effects. To the best of our knowledge, no other approach to the speciﬁcation
and automatic analysis of business processes encompasses all the above aspects: [19,20] consider complex security policy
but do not take into account the workﬂow; [21,22] analyze SoD constraints while considering both the workﬂow and
the security policy but do not support implicit preconditions of tasks, events, roles hierarchy, and delegation; ﬁnally [5]
considers the workﬂow and an RBAC security policy enhanced with delegation but does not consider, e.g., nondeterministic,
indirect, and conditional effects of tasks, events, and policy exceptions.
More speciﬁcally we show that C supports
• the separate speciﬁcation of the workﬂow and of the associated security policy;
• the formal and declarative speciﬁcation of a wide range of security policies;
• the speciﬁcation of a variety of business process features, e.g., events, tasks with nondeterministic, indirect, and condi-
tional effects; and, most importantly,
• the seamless integration of all the above aspects.
Moreover C provides modelers with the ability to specify the system incrementally. This is an important feature that
is seldom supported by the speciﬁcation languages of state-of-the-art model-checkers. We substantiate this observation by
comparing C with SMV, the speciﬁcation language of the NuSMV model checker [23,24].
We also show that a variety of automated reasoning tasks occurring in the domain of business processes can be recast
as (a sequence of) satisﬁability problems of C speciﬁcations which can be automatically tackled with the aid of CCalc:
1. to establish whether the control ﬂow together with the security policy meets the expected security properties;
2. for a given number of agents, synthesize a security policy for the business process under given security requirements;
3. for a given number of agents and for all execution ﬂows, ﬁnd (if any) an assignment of activities to agents ensuring the
process executability according to the given security policy.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we provide a brief introduction to business processes
under authorization constraints and describe our working example, which will be used throughout the paper. In Section 3
we overview the action language C . In Section 4 we show how a business process under authorization constraints can be
modeled in C . In Section 5 we describe the analysis of the LOP carried out with CCalc. Then, in Section 6 we compare C
and SMV. In Section 7 we discuss the related work and we conclude in Section 8 with some ﬁnal remarks.
2. Business processes under authorization constraints
Let us consider the Loan Origination Process (LOP) graphically presented in Fig. 1. The workﬂow of the process is rep-
resented by means of an extended elementary net (see, e.g., [25]), a simple Petri net [2], extended with conditional arcs
between places and transitions.
Let a fact be an atomic proposition. A literal is either a fact or its negation.
Formally, an extended elementary net is a 6-uple 〈S, T , A, F , γ ,M0〉 where
• S and T are ﬁnite sets of places and transitions, respectively, such that S ∩ T = ∅;
• A ⊆ (S×T )∪(T × S) is the ﬂow relation, representing a set of directed arcs connecting places and transitions. Places from
which arcs run to a transition are called the input places of the transition; places to which arcs run from a transition
are called the output places of the transition;
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• F is a set of facts, and the set of literals over F is denoted with L. A set of literals L is consistent if and only if L does
not contain a fact and its negation;
• γ : (S × T ) → L is a function that associates arcs between places and transitions with literals over F expressing appli-
cability conditions;
• M0 ⊆ S deﬁnes the initial marking for places.
In Fig. 1
• S = {p1,p2,p3,p4,p5,p6,p7,p8,p9,p10,p11,p12,p12,p13,p14,p15,p16,p17,p18};
• T = {exec(inputCustData), exec(prepareContract), exec(intRating),
exec(extRating), invoke(creditBureau), exec(approve), exec(sign),
exec(createAccount),beginFlow1,beginFlow2,beginFlow3,
endFlow1, endFlow2, endFlow3,nop1,nop2,nop3};
• A = {(p1, exec(inputCustData)), (p2,beginFlow1),
(p3, exec(prepareContract)), (p4,beginFlow2),
(p5, endFlow1), (p6, exec(intRating)),
(p7, invoke(creditBureau)), (p7,nop1),
(p8, endFlow2), (p9, exec(extRating)),
(p9,nop2), (p10, endFlow2),
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(p13,nop3), (p13,beginFlow3),
(p14, exec(sign)), (p15, exec(createAccount)),
(p16, endFlow3), (p17, endFlow3),
(exec(inputCustData),p2), (beginFlow1,p3),
(beginFlow1,p4), (exec(prepareContract),p5),
(beginFlow2,p6), (beginFlow2,p7),
(exec(intRating),p8), (nop1,p10),
(invoke(creditBureau),p9), (nop2,p7),
(exec(extRating),p10), (endFlow2,p11),
(endFlow1,p12), (exec(approve),p13),
(nop3,p18), (beginFlow3,p14),
(beginFlow3,p15), (exec(sign),p16),
(exec(createAccount),p17), (endFlow3,p18)};
• F = {highValue, interrupted,productApproved};
• γ (p7, invoke(creditBureau)) = highValue, γ (p7,nop1) = ¬highValue,
γ (p9,nop2) = interrupted, γ (p9, exec(extRating)) = ¬interrupted,
γ (p13,beginFlow3) = productApproved, γ (p13,nop3) = ¬productApproved;
• M0 = {p1}.
A state of the extended elementary net is a pair (M, L), where M is a marking and L ⊆ L is a maximally consistent set of
literals (i.e., a truth-value assignment to the facts in F ). A marking represents an execution state of the extended elementary
net, initially set to M0. Given a marking M , a set of literal L and a place p, if p ∈ M then we say that the place p contains
a token, otherwise we say that p is empty. Starting from M0, a transition of the extended elementary net can ﬁre if there is
a token in every input place of the transition and the conditions associated with the arcs between the input places and the
transition hold in L. As a consequence, a new marking is reached where, for a transition that has ﬁred, each output place
contains a token, while the token of each input place is eliminated, and L is updated by the effects of the transition.
Fig. 1 represents the LOP as an extended elementary net. Notice that in our model we have some artiﬁcially added
transitions to begin/end a ﬂow of business activities (i.e., transitions beginFlow1, beginFlow2, beginFlow3, endFlow1, endFlow2,
and endFlow3) and to skip certain operations according to particular conditions (i.e., transitions nop1, nop2, and nop3). Such
transitions are thus inserted for workﬂow modeling purposes, and are triggered as soon as their preconditions hold.
In our example, the process starts with the input of the customer’s data (inputCustData). Afterwards a contract for the
current customer is prepared (prepareContract) while the customer’s rating evaluation takes place concurrently. By means of
the rating evaluation the bank establishes if the customer is suitable to receive the loan. In our model, the execution follows
different paths: if the amount of the requested loan is not high (¬highValue), then an internal rating suﬃces (intRating);
otherwise, an external rating (extRating) is executed concurrently by invoking a Credit Bureau, a third-party ﬁnancial insti-
tution. As soon as it is ascertained that the external rating is needed, a request to obtain the credit information about the
current customer is sent to the Credit Bureau (invoke(creditBureau)). By using this information, the external rating evaluation
is performed by executing the task extRating. Notice that the invocation of the Credit Bureau and the execution of the task
extRating must be performed by the same agent. In case there is a forbidden access to the information sent by the Credit
Bureau to the bank, i.e., an agent who is not the director and different from the one who sent the request has accessed
the information exchanged, then the execution of the task is prevented and the rating evaluation is interrupted. In case
of interruption, the director of the bank must re-invoke the Credit Bureau and execute the task extRating. Thus, the loop
in Fig. 1 can be executed at most once.2 The loan request must then be approved (approve) by the bank. As soon as the
customer and the bank have reached an agreement, the contract is signed (sign) and an account for the customer is created
concurrently (createAccount). Notice that the execution of a task may affect the state of the process. In particular
• task inputCustData may modify the state of the execution by issuing statements about the type of customer (i.e., if it is
industrial, isIndustrial) and the amount of the loan (i.e., if it is high, highValue),
• task intRating may issue statements about the evaluation of the customer, i.e., if the internal rating of the customer is
positive, and
• tasks approve may issue a statement asserting if the proposed product is suitable or not for the customer.
Moreover a task may perform further operations affecting the state of the process only if some conditions hold. In particular,
in case the customer is industrial, during the evaluation of the internal rating the bank also establishes if it is important to
deserve a particular care to the customer, i.e., if the customer is industrial the task intRating may issue a statement asserting
if the customer has a high proﬁle (highProﬁleIndCust). Finally, different statements may determine new process features, e.g.,
2 Note that this does not limit the speciﬁcation capabilities of our approach: the fact that such loop can be executed at most once is, by chance, the
result of the separate speciﬁcation of the workﬂow (which allows for multiple executions of the loop) with a particular security policy adopted.
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Permission assignment for the LOP.
Task Role
inputCustData preprocessor
prepareContract postprocessor
intRating if (isIndustrial) then postprocessor else preprocessor
extRating if (interrupted) then director else supervisor
approve if (lowRisk) then manager else director
sign if (highProﬁleIndCust) then director else manager
createAccount postprocessor
the lowRisk condition is used to denote a situation in which the internal rating is positive and the amount of the loan is
not high.
An agent can execute a task only if she has the required permissions. As it is common in the business domain, the
security policy of the LOP relies on an access control model based on RBAC enhanced with delegations and separation of
duty constraints. According to the RBAC model [4], in order to perform a task an agent must be assigned a role enabled
to execute the task and the agent must be also active in that role. The roles used in our case study are director, manager,
supervisor, postprocessor, and preprocessor. Roles can be organized hierarchically. In our case study, a director is more senior
than a manager and a supervisor is more senior than a postprocessor. Senior roles inherit the permissions to perform tasks
assigned to more junior roles. Thus, an agent can execute a task if her role
• is directly assigned the required permissions; or
• is more senior than a role owning such permissions.
In our case study we consider permission assignments subject to the following requirements:
• task inputCustData is assigned to role preprocessor;
• tasks prepareContract and intRating cannot be assigned to roles director or manager;
• task createAccount cannot be assigned to roles director, manager, or preprocessor;
• tasks approve and sign cannot be assigned to roles preprocessor, postprocessor, or supervisor;
• if a customer is industrial, then role preprocessor cannot be enabled to perform the task intRating;
• if the process has been interrupted, the task extRating has to be performed by a director;
• if the process has not been interrupted, the task extRating cannot be assigned to roles director, or manager;
• if the risk of the loan is not low, then role manager cannot be enabled to perform the task approve;
• if the industrial customer has a high proﬁle, then role manager cannot be enabled to perform the task sign.
Table 1 shows a possible permission assignment for the LOP satisfying the requirements presented above. Notice that the
invocation of the Credit Bureau does not appear in Table 1 as this activity has to be executed by the same agent of the task
extRating and, as a consequence, uses its permission assignment.
A user assignment is a relation that associates agents and roles. We consider a static assignment of agents to roles subject
to the following requirements:
• there must be only one director,
• the director must not be assigned to any other role,
• an agent must not be assigned to roles hierarchically related, e.g., an agent cannot be assigned to the roles supervisor
and postprocessor, and
• an agent can be assigned to two different roles at most.
Notice that the requirements we have speciﬁed above, for both permission and user assignments, correspond to a class
of security policies, given, e.g., the use of conditional statements in the permission assignment.
A possible user assignment for the LOP is given by the following assignments of agents to roles: davide, the director,
maria and marco, managers, pierPaolo, who can act both as preprocessing clerk and as postprocessing clerk, pierSilvio, who
can act both as preprocessing clerk and as supervisor, pietro, postprocessing clerk, and stefano, supervisor.
Our RBAC access control model is enhanced with delegation that represents a typical ﬂexibility requirement. Following
the idea of conditional delegation presented in [26], we consider delegation rules of the form
〈PreConds,ARole,DRole,Task〉
where ARole and DRole are roles, Task is a task, and PreConds is a set of conditions that must hold for the delegation to
be applicable. A delegation rule states that if PreConds holds and ARole is authorized to perform Task according to the
permission assignments, then ARole can delegate DRole to execute Task. We also distinguish between grant and transfer
delegation [27]. Considering a grant delegation rule, both agents involved are then allowed to perform the task being
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Delegation rules of the LOP.
Name Type Delegation rule
D1 transfer 〈¬isIndustrial, supervisor,postprocessor, extRating〉
D2 grant 〈intRatingPositive,manager, supervisor,approve〉
D3 grant 〈¬highValue,director, supervisor, sign〉
Table 3
Critical tasks of each object-based SoD of the LOP.
Name Object Critical tasks
C1 customer’s data inputCustData,prepareContract, intRating, extRating
C2 rating report intRating, extRating
C3 contract prepareContract,approve, sign
delegated; considering a transfer delegation rule the ability to perform the task is transferred and the agent who executed
the delegation cannot perform the delegated task anymore. Notice that our delegation rules express task delegation rather
than role delegation. In fact, the delegated agent does not acquire a new role but she only obtains the permission to perform
Task by means of ARole. Also notice that in [26] three different kinds of conditions are considered, i.e., temporal, value, and
workload delegation conditions, however in our work PreConds can only be related to the value of the attributes of the
process, i.e., value delegation conditions. In our case study we consider the delegation rules in Table 2.
We also consider the ability of the director to disable an agent from performing a task overriding the security policy in
use. As a result, an agent can execute a task if she is granted the permission by means of the RBAC model or by means of
delegation unless the director explicitly disables her from performing the task.
Finally, the RBAC model of our case study is enhanced with a mechanism that is necessary to satisfy separation of duty
(SoD) constraints. SoD constraints are used for internal control and amount to requiring that some critical tasks are executed
by different agents (see [5] for a survey on SoD). In this paper we focus on a relaxed form of object-based SoD according to
which an agent can access the same object through different roles as long as she does not perform all the tasks accessing
that object. For each object involved in the LOP, we deﬁne the corresponding critical tasks consisting of all and only the
tasks accessing the object. We then assume that an agent cannot execute all the critical tasks associated to each object.
Such associations are presented in Table 3.
3. The action language C
Action languages are high level formalisms for expressing actions and how they affect the world described with a set
of atomic formulas called ﬂuents. Thus, the signature σ of the language is partitioned into the ﬂuent symbols σ ﬂ and the
action symbols σ act . Intuitively, actions are a subset of the interpretations of σ act while states are a subset of the interpre-
tations of σ ﬂ . A formula in σ is a propositional combination of atoms. Each action language differs from the others for the
constructs used to characterize how actions affect states.
C [18] is an expressive propositional action language allowing for two kinds of propositions: static laws of the form
caused F if G (1)
and dynamic laws of the form
caused F if G after H, (2)
where F and G are ﬂuent formulas (i.e., formulas in σ ﬂ) and H is an action formula (i.e., a formula in σ ). In a proposition of
either kind, the formula F will be called the head of the law.
An action description is a set of propositions. Consider an action description D . A state is an interpretation of σ ﬂ that
satisﬁes G ⊃ F for every static law (1) in D . A transition is any triple 〈s,a, s′〉 where s, s′ are states and a is an action; s is
the initial state of the transition, and s′ is its resulting state. A formula F is caused in a transition 〈s,a, s′〉 if it is
• the head of a static law (1) from D such that s′ satisﬁes G , or
• the head of a dynamic law (2) from D such that s′ satisﬁes G and s ∪ a satisﬁes H .
A transition 〈s,a, s′〉 is causally explained according to D if its resulting state s′ is the only interpretation of σ ﬂ that satisﬁes
all formulas caused in this transition.
The transition diagram represented by an action description D is the directed graph which has the states of D as nodes
and includes an edge from s to s′ labeled a for every transition 〈s,a, s′〉 that is causally explained according to D . Intuitively,
if 〈s,a, s′〉 is a transition of the diagram, the concurrent execution of the atomic actions satisﬁed by a causes a transition
from the state s to the state s′ . Despite the fact that C consists of only two kinds of propositions, several other propositions
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Abbreviations for causal laws.
Abbreviation Expanded form Informal meaning
nonexecutable H ′ if F caused ⊥ after H ′ ∧ F ¬F is a precondition of H ′
H ′ causes F if G caused F if  after G ∧ H ′ F is true after H ′ is executed
in a state in which G is true
H ′ may cause F if G caused F if F after H ′ ∧ G F is true by default after H ′ is executed
in a state in which G is true
default F caused F if F F is true by default
caused F if G unless Q caused F if G ∧ ¬Q , F is true after G in a state
default ¬Q in which Q is false
constraint F caused ⊥ if ¬F F must be true
inertial F caused F if F after F , F is inertial
caused ¬F if ¬F after ¬F
exogenous F default F , F is exogenous
default ¬F
Fig. 2. Transition diagram for action description (3).
can be deﬁned as abbreviations of either (1) or (2), modeling, e.g., actions’ preconditions, actions’ nondeterministic effects,
ﬂuents with default values, and inertial ﬂuents. The abbreviations used in this paper are given in Table 4, where F and G
are deﬁned as before, and H ′ is a formula in σ act .
Example. (See [18].) Let σ ﬂ = {P , Q }, σ act = {A}, and let D consist of the propositions
inertial P , Q ,
caused P after Q ∧ A. (3)
The second line of (3) tells us that P is made true by the execution of A if the precondition Q is satisﬁed (as, for instance,
in the familiar shooting example which corresponds to Dead as P , Loaded as Q , and Shoot as A). Preconditions are speciﬁc
conditions holding in a state they are executed. According to Table 4, (3) is a shorthand for
caused P if P after P ,
caused ¬P if ¬P after ¬P ,
caused Q if Q after Q ,
caused ¬Q if ¬Q after ¬Q ,
caused P if True after Q ∧ A. (4)
In this action description, there are 4 states (P Q , P Q , P Q , P Q ) 3 and 2 actions (A and A). Consequently, there are
4 × 2 × 4 = 32 transitions. Out of these, 8 transitions are causally explained: 〈P Q , A, P Q 〉 and the transitions of the form
〈s,a, s〉 where s = P Q or a = A.
Fig. 2 shows the corresponding transition diagram. We can see from it that each of the actions A, A can be executed
in any state in exactly one way. To check that the transition 〈P Q , A, P Q 〉 is causally explained, note that the formulas
3 We represent a propositional interpretation by listing the literals that are satisﬁed by it. L is the literal complementary to L.
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Fluents and their informal meaning.
Fluent Meaning
activated(a, r) agent a is playing role r
accessed(a) agent a has accessed the information sent by the Credit Bureau
delegated(a, r, t) agent a is delegated by an agent in role r to perform task t
disabled(a, t) agent a cannot perform task t
pa(r, t) role r has the permission to perform task t
ua(a, r) agent a is assigned to role r
granted(a, r, t) agent a obtained by means of role r the permission to perform task t
executed(a, t) agent a has executed task t
invoked(a, r, e) agent a has invoked entity e obtaining the authorization from role r
senior(r1, r2) role r1 is more senior than or is as senior as r2
lowRisk the risk associated with the loan is low
highValue the loan amount is high w.r.t. the ﬁnancial status of the customer
isIndustrial the customer is industrial
highProﬁleIndCust the industrial customer has a high proﬁle
intRatingPositive the customer’s internal rating is positive
productApproved both the customer and the bank agree on the contract
interrupted the execution of the process is interrupted
p1, . . . ,p18 the places of the extended elementary net (cf. Fig. 1)
Table 6
Actions and their informal meaning.
Actions Meaning
exec(a, r, t) agent a executes task t by means of role r
invoke(a, r, e) agent a invokes entity e obtaining the authorization from role r
disable(a1,a2, t) agent a1 disables agent a2 from performing task t
d1(a1,a2) agent a1 delegates agent a2 by means of delegation rule d1
d2(a1,a2) agent a1 delegates agent a2 by means of delegation rule d2
d3(a1,a2) agent a1 delegates agent a2 by means of delegation rule d3
beginFlow1 dummy activity to begin the ﬁrst ﬂow of business activities in Fig. 1
endFlow1 dummy activity to end the ﬁrst ﬂow of business activities in Fig. 1
beginFlow2 dummy activity to begin the second ﬂow of business activities in Fig. 1
endFlow2 dummy activity to end the second ﬂow of business activities in Fig. 1
nop1, nop2, nop3 dummy activities to skip operations
caused in this transition are the heads Q , P of the 3rd and 5th propositions in (4), and that the resulting state P Q of the
transition is the only interpretation that satisﬁes both heads. We can also see that 〈P Q , A, P Q 〉 is not causally explained:
the only formula caused in this transition is the head Q of the 3rd proposition in (4), and Q is satisﬁed by more than one
interpretation.
4. Formal modeling of business processes with C
We now present a list of desired features for modeling business processes under authorization constraints, and we show
the natural correspondence between the features, exempliﬁed by using the LOP as a working example, and the C constructs
we use. This section clearly shows that C is a well-suited modeling language for our domain.
The set of ﬂuents involved consists of the ﬂuents listed in Table 5. All the ﬂuents in Table 5 but pa(r, t), lowRisk,
granted(a, r, t), activated(a, r), accessed(a), and disabled(a, t) are inertial. The set of actions involved is listed in Table 6. All
the ﬂuents in Table 5 and actions in Table 6 have to be suitably instantiated for all tasks and roles in Table 1 and the set of
available agents.
4.1. Internal and external events
Events are effects of activities which are not explicitly represented in the model. We distinguish between internal and
external events
• internal events are effects of procedures implemented within the process but not explicitly represented in the model;
• external events are effects of activities which are not part of the process but whose effects have an impact on the
process itself.
Examples in the LOP are, respectively,
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is assigned to that role; and
• the access to some information by an agent not allowed to, which is modeled as an external event making sure that
once an agent has accessed the information, a trace of this event remains in the process.
Internal and external events are modeled in C as exogenous ﬂuents. Exogenous ﬂuents are ﬂuents that can change their
value during the transition from one state to another (unless there is some other law constraining their values). In the case
of the LOP, two exogenous ﬂuents are used:
exogenous activated(a, r),accessed(a).
The former is subject to the law
caused ¬activated(a, r) if ¬ua(a, r)
to state that an agent cannot be active in a role she is not assigned to. The latter is subject to the law
caused accessed(a) after accessed(a)
to state that the access to the information exchanged in the process by an agent is not reversible.
4.2. Execution of tasks and invocation of entities
The execution of a task can take place only if its preconditions are met. Preconditions of each task contain information
about
• the input places of the corresponding transition in the extended elementary net;
• the condition associated with the arc from the input places, if any; and
• the authorized agent that will perform the task by means of the ﬂuent granted(a, r, t).
In C , preconditions can be expressed by the law
nonexecutable H if ¬F (5)
where H is an action formula and F is a formula expressing the preconditions of H . Consider a task t , and let I be the set
of input places of the transition, and I ′ the set of conditions on the arcs from the input places (if any). Task preconditions
have the following pattern:
nonexecutable exec(a, r, t) if ¬
(∧
p∈I
p ∧
∧
f ∈I ′
f ∧ granted(a, r, t)
)
.
An example about intRating is the following
nonexecutable exec(a, r, intRating) if ¬(p6 ∧ granted(a, r, intRating)).
Note that for the task extRating we do not need to add the ﬂuent granted(a, r, extRating) in its preconditions as it is implicit
in invoked(a, r, creditBureau) because, as presented in Section 2, the task extRating must be executed by the same agent who
performed invoke(a, r, creditBureau), i.e.,
nonexecutable exec(a, r, extRating) if ¬(p9 ∧ ¬interrupted∧ invoked(a, r, creditBureau)).
The execution of tasks has deterministic effects that affect the process each time the task is performed. Consider a task t ,
and let I (resp. O ) be the set of input (resp. output) places of the related transition. The speciﬁcations of the deterministic
effects of a task is C have the following pattern:
exec(a, r, t) causes
∧
p∈I
¬p ∧
∧
p′∈O
p′ ∧ executed(a, t).
As an example, the deterministic effects of the execution of task intRating are expressed in C with
exec(a, r, intRating) causes p8 ∧ ¬p6 ∧ executed(a, intRating).
Some effects of a task can be nondeterministic, i.e., they can, or cannot, be true in the resulting state. As an example,
the execution of task intRating has the nondeterministic effect of switching to true the internal rating of a customer initially
128 A. Armando et al. / Journal of Computer and System Sciences 78 (2012) 119–141set to false. The corresponding C construct is
exec(a, r, intRating) may cause intRatingPositive.
The execution of a task can also have conditional effects, i.e., effects which can take place or not depending on the state
in which the task is executed. As an example, if the customer is industrial the task intRating does not only evaluate if the
internal rating is positive but also establishes if the customer has a high proﬁle, i.e., if it is convenient for the bank to
reserve particular care to this customer. The result of this evaluation is nondeterministic and conditional as it only takes
place if the customer is industrial. This can be expressed in C with
exec(a, r, intRating) may cause highProﬁleIndCust if isIndustrial.
The execution of a task can also have some indirect effects in addition to those explicitly stated, resulting from the
interaction among action effects and/or static laws. As an example, the execution of task inputCustData, that has the nonde-
terministic effect of stating if the customer is industrial, has an indirect effect on the permission assignment of the RBAC
model. In fact, according to the permission assignments of Table 1, the permission to execute task intRating is given to role
postprocessor if the customer is industrial. This can be expressed in C with the law
caused pa(postprocessor, intRating) if isIndustrial
where pa(postprocessor, intRating) can be an indirect effect of the execution of inputCustData through its nondeterministic
effect isIndustrial. Notice that pa(postprocessor, intRating) is a statically determined ﬂuent, i.e., a ﬂuent whose value is deter-
mined by means of static laws only. Also notice that we set the value of pa(postprocessor, intRating) to be false by default
by means of
default ¬pa(postprocessor, intRating).
Laws related to an invocation of an entity have the same patterns as for the execution of a task. As an example the
invocation of the Credit Bureau can be expressed in C by
nonexecutable invoke(a, r, creditBureau) if ¬(p7 ∧ highValue∧ granted(a, r, extRating)) (6)
where invoke(a, r, creditBureau) is the action symbol, p7 is the input place as shown in Fig. 1, highValue represents the
condition associated with the arc between place p7 and the current transition, and granted(a, r, extRating) expresses the fact
that the invocation must be performed by an agent granted the right to execute the task extRating as presented in Section 2.
Deterministic effects of the invocation of an entity can be expressed in C in the same way as for the invocation of tasks.
As an example, the deterministic effects of the invocation of the Credit Bureau are expressed by
invoke(a, r, creditBureau) causes p9 ∧ ¬p7 ∧ invoked(a, creditBureau).
According to (6), in our working example the invocation of the Credit Bureau cannot be executed if the preconditions do
not hold; however, in case the preconditions hold, the invocation is not forced. The fact that in our working example the
invocation of the Credit Bureau is triggered as soon as its preconditions hold can be expressed in C with
nonexecutable ¬invoke(a, r, creditBureau) if p7 ∧ highValue∧ granted(a, r, extRating).
4.3. Delegation of tasks
As in Section 4.2, the preconditions for delegation express the requirements for the delegation to take place and are
expressed in C by a formula of the form (5). The set of preconditions for the delegation of tasks through the delegation
rules presented in Section 2 has a common pattern. In fact, a delegation of a task always requires that
• an agent is assigned to the role ARole of the rule,
• there exists a permission assignment between Arole and Task,
• an agent is assigned to the role DRole of the rule,
• PreConds are satisﬁed,
regardless the type of delegation. The preconditions of the rules in Table 2 in C have the following pattern
nonexecutable d(a1,a2) if ¬
(
ua(a1,Arole) ∧ ua(a2,Drole) ∧ pa(Arole,Task) ∧ Preconds
)
for all a1 = a2.
For example the preconditions of rule D1 are expressed with
nonexecutable d1(a1,a2) if ¬
(
ua(a1, supervisor)∧ua(a2,postprocessor)∧pa(supervisor, extRating)∧¬isIndustrial
)
.
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the business process; as a result, a delegation can be performed not only if its preconditions are fulﬁlled but also if its
execution does not violate existing dependencies. In C implicit preconditions can be expressed by means of static laws. As
an example, delegation has the effect of granting the execution of a task t to an agent a by means of a role r, granted(a, r, t).
It appears reasonable that a delegated agent must not be disabled from executing the delegated task. In the LOP case study
this can be achieved with
caused ¬granted(a, r, t) if disabled(a, t) (7)
to state that ¬disabled(a, t) is an implicit precondition for the delegation of task t to agent a. Notice that this is not
equivalent to add ¬disabled(a, t) to the preconditions of the delegation as it corresponds to the fact that the agent is not
disabled in the state before the delegation. On the other hand, (7) requires ¬granted(a, r, t) whenever disabled(a, t) holds.
Delegation of tasks has the deterministic effect of granting the execution of the tasks to the delegated agents. Moreover,
in case of transfer delegation the agent who performed the delegation is disabled from performing the delegated task in
the future. Given Type to be the type of delegation, Type ∈ {transfer, grant}, the deterministic effects can be expressed in C
using the following pattern
d(a1,a2) causes granted(a1,Arole,Task) ∧ delegated(a2,Arole, task)
∧
Type=trasfer
disabled(a1,Task) (8)
for all a1 = a2.
As an example, the deterministic effects of the transfer delegation rule D1 are expressed by
d1(a1,a2) causes granted(a1, supervisor, extRating) ∧ delegated(a2, supervisor, extRating) ∧ disabled(a1, extRating)
(9)
while the deterministic effects of the grant delegation rule D2 are expressed with
d2(a1,a2) causes granted(a1,manager,approve) ∧ delegated(a2,manager,approve).
Notice that the ﬂuent disabled(a, extRating) as effect of rule D1 in (8) represents the means of transfer delegation: the
agent performing the delegation is disabled from performing the task in the future.
4.4. Internal dependencies
Different elements within a business process may be characterized by dependencies. For example results of evaluations
performed during the process may inﬂuence the value assumed by other ﬂuents describing the state of the process.
In C such dependencies can be expressed by means of static laws. As an example, the inertial ﬂuent interrupted depends
on the value of other ﬂuents as follows
caused interrupted if p9 ∧ invoked(a1, r, creditBureau) ∧ accessed(a2)
for all a1 = a2 and r = director, and
caused ¬interrupted if p9 ∧ invoked(a,director, creditBureau).
As another example, the statically determined ﬂuent lowRisk has a default value false expressed with
default ¬lowRisk
and depends on the value of highValue and intRatingPositive through
caused lowRisk if ¬highValue∧ intRatingPositive
to state that the risk of a loan is low if its amount is not high and the internal rating is positive.
4.5. Workﬂow
As we have already seen in Section 2, the workﬂow of a business process manages the invocation of entities and the
execution of tasks: in our work we model it by adding “dummy” activities to begin/end a ﬂow of business activities and to
skip certain operations.
In C these activities can be expressed by dynamic laws. The preconditions of dummy activities only deal with input places
and conditions associated to inner arcs, if any. Moreover, being activities that do not require to be performed by an agent
and do not perform any task, dummy activities are triggered as soon as their preconditions hold. Consider an activity e, and
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from the input places (if any). Such activities follow the pattern
nonexecutable e if ¬
(∧
p∈I
p ∧
∧
f ∈I ′
f
)
,
nonexecutable ¬e if
∧
p∈I
p ∧
∧
f ∈I ′
f ,
e causes
∧
p∈I
¬p ∧
∧
p′∈O
p′.
As an example, nop1 is expressed by
nonexecutable nop1 if ¬(p7 ∧ ¬highValue),
nonexecutable ¬nop1 if p7 ∧ ¬highValue,
nop1 causes p10 ∧ ¬p7.
4.6. Separation of duty constraints
SoD represents an important aspect of business processes used to prevent frauds by stating that conﬂicting tasks must
be performed by different agents. With reference to the LOP, SoD constraints in Table 3 can be expressed in C by static
laws constraining each set of critical tasks to be executed by at least two different agents. For example, constraint C3 is
expressed by
constraint ¬(executed(a, r1,prepareContract) ∧ executed(a, r2,approve) ∧ executed(a, r3, sign)).
4.7. Security policy
The security policy establishes which agent can perform which task. As described in Section 2, we consider a security
policy based on an RBAC model enhanced with delegation and SoD constraints. We model the permission of an agent a
to perform a task t with role r using the ﬂuent granted(a, r, t). Then, the RBAC model enhanced with delegation can be
expressed with the law
caused granted(a, r, t) if ua(a, r) ∧ activated(a, r) ∧ pa(r1, t) ∧ senior(r, r1) (10)
and
caused ¬granted(a, r, t) if ¬ua(a, r) ∨ ¬activated(a, r)
∨
( ∧
r1∈R
(¬pa(r1, t) ∨ ¬senior(r, r1))
)
unless delegated(a, r, t) (11)
where R is the set of roles involved in the business process. Notice that (11) is made defeasible by “unless delegated(a, r, t)”
to express the fact that an agent can be granted the execution of a task even if she does not fulﬁll the RBAC model assuming
she has been delegated to execute it. Also notice that in the overall speciﬁcation of a business process an agent can be
granted the execution of a task only if the SoD constraints speciﬁed as presented in Section 4.6 are satisﬁed.
As it appears from (10), the RBAC model relies both on the user assignment, ua(a, r), and the permission assignment,
pa(r, t). A speciﬁc, static, user assignment can be expressed in C by initializing the inertial ﬂuents ua(a, r) in the initial state
as long as no action affects their values. In this way, the assignment of agents to roles will not change during the process
execution. As an example, the static assignment of agents davide and maria given in Section 2 can be modeled as follows
ua(davide,director),
¬ua(davide, r1),
ua(maria,manager),
¬ua(maria, r2)
for all r1 = director and r2 = manager.
A speciﬁc permission assignment can be expressed in C by deﬁning the ﬂuents pa(r, t) as statically determined and
specifying static causal laws for them. As an example, an excerpt of the permission assignment in Table 1 can be expressed
in C by
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default ¬pa(postprocessor, inputCustData),
caused pa(preprocessor, intRating) if ¬isIndustrial,
default ¬pa(preprocessor, intRating),
caused pa(postprocessor, intRating) if isIndustrial,
default ¬pa(postprocessor, intRating).
Notice that the assignment of permissions to roles can change during the process execution according to some conditions.
The partial speciﬁcations on user and permission assignments can, in general, be modeled by means of the set of re-
quirements they have to ensure. As an example, for the speciﬁc requirements on a user assignment deﬁned in Section 2,
the following C laws can be used
constraint ¬(ua(a1,director) ∧ ua(a2,director)),
constraint ¬(ua(a,director) ∧ ua(a, r)),
constraint ¬(ua(a, supervisor) ∧ ua(a,postprocessor)),
constraint ¬(ua(a, r1) ∧ ua(a, r2) ∧ ua(a, r3))
for all a1 = a2, r1 = r2, r2 = r3, r1 = r3, and r = director.
Analogously, an excerpt of the requirements for the permission assignments deﬁned in Section 2 can be expressed in C
with
constraint ¬isIndustrial∨ ¬pa(preprocessor, intRating),
constraint ¬highProﬁleIndCust∨ ¬pa(manager, sign).
Notice that in this case the ﬂuents pa(r, t) are deﬁned as exogenous.
4.8. Exceptions
A business process may also be characterized by exceptions to its normal behavior. In the presented scenario the security
policy is based on an RBAC model enhanced with delegation. However, we can have exceptions to the RBAC, e.g., in case an
important agent (e.g., a director) decides to do so. To model this behavior in C we enhance the model with a law
disable(a1,a2, t) causes disabled(a2, t) ∧
∧
r∈R
(¬granted(a2, r, t)) if ua(a1,director) ∧ ¬disabled(a2, t) (12)
where a1 = a2, and modifying (10) as follows
caused granted(a, r, t) if ua(a, r) ∧ activated(a, r) ∧ pa(r1, t) ∧ senior(r, r1) unless disabled(a, t)
to make the policy defeasible, i.e., an agent can be granted the execution of a task unless a director disables her from
executing the task.
5. Experiments
Given a set of causal laws expressed in C and a query (i.e., a Boolean formulas built out of time-indexed facts), CCalc
automatically checks whether there exist paths in the transition system speciﬁed by the action description that satisﬁes the
query. The length of the path considered is determined by ﬁxing the maxstep variable in CCalc. In particular, CCalc
1. produces a description of the transition system in the form of a set of clauses (where a clause is a disjunction of
literals): assuming the head of each causal law is a literal (as in the LOP), this process is done in polynomial time
through literal completion [28];
2. produces maxstep− 1 copies of the clauses, each copy corresponding to a time step as in planning as satisﬁability [29];
3. converts each query into a corresponding set of clauses; the clauses generated so far are such that there exists a 1–1
correspondence between the paths of length maxstep of the transition system satisfying the query and the assignments
satisfying the set of clauses;
4. calls a SAT solver to determine an assignment satisfying the set of clauses (if any);
5. if the SAT solver returns a satisfying assignment, then the corresponding path is returned to the user.
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in the transition diagram corresponding to the formalization of the LOP as an action description. Indeed, in our formalization
we have transitions from one state to the state itself because no action is performed. These loops, called stuttering steps (cf.,
p. 17 in [30]), can be practically useful because they allow us to have paths in the transition diagram with length maxstep
corresponding to paths in the extended elementary net with length  maxstep. (Because of the security policy, the loop
in the LOP can be executed at most once, and thus maxstep = 14.) Considering that only p1 is true in the initial states of
the transition diagram, we take into account all the possible paths in the extended elementary net leaving from p1. Other
conditions on paths are imposed depending on the speciﬁc problem we consider, detailed in the following subsections. The
complete speciﬁcation is available at http://www.ai-lab.it/serena/jcss.txt.
In the rest of this section we describe how we have used CCalc (i) to establish whether the control ﬂow together with
the security policy meets the expected security properties, (ii) to synthesize a security policy for the business process under
given security requirements, and (iii) to ﬁnd a resource allocation plan ensuring the process executability according to the
given security policy.
5.1. Veriﬁcation of security properties
The security policy of a business process manages the access of agents to tasks, and should ensure that undesirable
behaviors, e.g., frauds, do not occur. In this paper the security policy is given in terms of an RBAC model enriched with del-
egation rules and object-based SoD constraints. Because of the complexity of the resulting speciﬁcations, and the interplay
with the security policy, it may not be trivial to establish if other desirable security properties hold (e.g., because entailed
by the already enforced security policy) or if it is necessary to revise the model and/or the security policy in order.
In our ﬁrst experiment we fed CCalc with the speciﬁcation of the LOP given in Section 4 featuring a security policy
characterized by
• a speciﬁc RBAC model with the permission assignment of Table 1 and the user assignment presented in Section 2;
• the delegation rules in Table 2; and
• the SoD constraints in Table 3,
and we considered the following property:
“If the process terminates successfully, then no single agent has performed all the tasks intRating, extRating if highValue,
approve, and sign.”
Thus, we used CCalc to determine whether there exists a path leading to a state in which the same agent performs the
tasks intRating, extRating if highValue, approve, and sign, i.e., where the following property is satisﬁed:
p18 ∧ productApproved∧ executed(a, intRating) ∧
(¬highValue∨ executed(a, extRating))
∧ executed(a,approve) ∧ executed(a, sign) (13)
CCalc found the trace, an excerpt of it is reported in Fig. 3. The trace shows that (13) is satisﬁed, i.e., the violation occurs, if
the loan amount is not high, i.e., ¬highValue, and thus the external rating is not evaluated. The perpetrator for the violation
is stefano, who executes intRating as supervisor and can nevertheless execute approve and sign by means of delegation. In fact
a manager, marco, delegates him to approve the document by means of the delegation rule D2 and the director delegates
him to sign the contract by means of the delegation rule D3. By inspecting the intermediate states of the trace it is easy to
conclude that the violation occurs if the internal rating is positive and the customer is industrial with a high proﬁle.
To avoid this violation we restricted the applicability conditions of delegation rule D2 by conjoining it with the fact
highValue. In fact, when the loan has not a high value, the security policy is less restrictive and the application of D2 must
be prevented. CCalc does not ﬁnd any violation in the speciﬁcation modiﬁed in this way.
The veriﬁcation of SoD properties over a version of the LOP is carried out by using NuSMV in [5]. However the case
study considered is rather different, e.g., the workﬂow (which involves different tasks) structure and the delegation model
are different and no exceptions to the RBAC security policy with delegation are considered. Moreover, the speciﬁcation of
the case study and the experimental analysis performed in [5] are not mature, e.g. though an RBAC policy is considered,
the assignment between agents and tasks, via roles, is static. Thus this work can be compared with ours w.r.t. the overall
approach and the expressiveness of the language used but it is not possible a comparison of the analysis results.
5.2. Synthesis of the permission assignment
In our second experiment we synthesize the permission assignment for an RBAC model for the LOP given the require-
ments for the user and the permission assignment presented in Section 2. Note that the approach we use is general as it
relies on the idea of partially deﬁning an aspect of the business process, i.e., only deﬁning a set of requirements we want
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it to satisfy, and automatically synthesizing a speciﬁc instance that ensures the process executability and satisﬁes the re-
quirements. As an example, in this experiment we consider the problem of synthesizing the permission assignment but the
approach could be used as well to synthesize the user assignment.
We fed CCalc with the speciﬁcation of the LOP given in Section 4 featuring a security policy characterized by
• a generic RBAC model with the requirements for the user and permission assignments given in Section 2; and
• the SoD constraints in Table 3,
and we considered the problem of ﬁnding a permission assignment that ensures a successful process execution. The process
ends successfully if it reaches a state in which both p18 and productApproved hold regardless of the value of intRatingPositive,
isIndustrial, highValue, and highProﬁleIndCust and the fact that the process has been interrupted. We have therefore run
CCalc against all possible scenarios requiring p18 ∧ productApproved and we extracted the permission assignment from the
execution traces returned by the tool. Additionally, we looked for a permission assignment such that the process can be
executed involving the minimal number of agents.
SoD constraints require at least two agents for performing the critical tasks. CCalc reports that it is not possible to
ﬁnd an execution path for all the scenarios with two agents. Thus, we considered three agents. In this case CCalc was
able to ﬁnd an execution trace for all the scenarios. We then extracted from the execution traces returned by the tool the
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Permission assignment for the LOP automatically synthesized.
Task Role
inputCustData preprocessor
prepareContract preprocessor
intRating if (isIndustrial) then postprocessor else preprocessor
extRating if (interrupted) then director else preprocessor
approve director
sign director
createAccount postprocessor
Table 8
Resource allocation plan for all scenarios where the process is interrupted.
Agent Roles Tasks
a1 preprocessor, supervisor inputCustData, intRating, prepareContract, createAccount
a2 director extRating, approve, sign
Table 9
Resource allocation plan for all scenarios where ¬highValue, intRatingPositive, isIndustrial, and
¬highProﬁleIndCust.
Agent Roles Tasks
a1 manager, supervisor intRating, approve, sign
a2 preprocessor, supervisor inputCustData, prepareContract, createAccount
Table 10
Resource allocation plan for all scenarios where ¬highValue, intRatingPositive, ¬isIndustrial, and
¬highProﬁleIndCust.
Agent Roles Tasks
a1 manager, postprocessor prepareContract, createAccount
a2 preprocessor, manager inputCustData, intRating, approve, sign
permission assignment through the values of the ﬂuents pa(r, t). The permission assignment we extracted is reported in
Table 7.
5.3. Resource allocation plan
Our last experiment was to determine a resource allocation plan ensuring a successful process completion according to
the security policy.
We fed CCalc with the speciﬁcation of the LOP given in Section 4 featuring a security policy characterized by
• the speciﬁc permission assignment in Table 1;
• a generic user assignment with the requirements given in Section 2;
• the delegation rules in Table 2 with the applicability conditions of D2 restricted according to Section 5.1; and
• the SoD constraints in Table 3,
and we considered the problem of ﬁnding for all possible scenarios a resource allocation plan that ensures a successful
process completion, i.e., p18 ∧productApproved. Notice that as a speciﬁc assignment of agents to roles is not given, a possible
agent-role assignment can also be obtained from the execution trace returned by CCalc.
As in Section 5.2, the process can take place in different scenarios characterized by different nondeterministic effects. As
a result, we run CCalc against all possible successful process completions and we extracted a resource allocation plan (i.e.,
an assignment of agents to tasks) from the execution trace returned by the tool. We considered the further requirement of
ﬁnding resource allocation plans involving the minimal number of agents.
Considering two agents, say a1 and a2, CCalc found an execution trace for all the scenarios where
• the process is interrupted; or
• intRatingPositive and isIndustrial hold while highValue and highProﬁleIndCust do not; or
• intRatingPositive holds while highValue, isIndustrial, and highProﬁleIndCust do not.
The resource allocations found by CCalc for each of these scenarios are reported in Tables 8, 9, and 10, respectively. However
CCalc could not ﬁnd a unique execution trace for all other scenarios involving only two agents.
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Resource allocation plan for all scenarios where highValue and ¬highProﬁleIndCust.
Agent Roles Tasks
a1 preprocessor, supervisor inputCustData, intRating, prepareContract
a2 manager, supervisor extRating, createAccount, sign
a3 director approve
Table 12
Resource allocation plan for all scenarios where highValue and highProﬁleIndCust.
Agent Roles Tasks
a1 preprocessor, postprocessor inputCustData, intRating, createAccount
a2 preprocessor, supervisor extRating, prepareContract
a3 director approve, sign
Table 13
Resource allocation plan for all scenarios where ¬highValue and highProﬁleIndCust.
Agent Roles Tasks
a1 preprocessor, supervisor inputCustData, sign
a2 manager, supervisor intRating, prepareContract, createAccount
a3 director approve
Table 14
Resource allocation plan for all scenarios where ¬highValue, ¬intRatingPositive, and
¬highProﬁleIndCust.
Agent Roles Tasks
a1 preprocessor, postprocessor inputCustData, createAccount
a2 preprocessor, postprocessor intRating, prepareContract
a3 director approve, sign
Thus, we considered three agents and CCalc found an execution trace for all the remaining scenarios. The resource allo-
cation plans extracted from the execution traces are reported in Tables 11, 12, 13, 14. In this way we obtained assignments
of agents to roles for every scenario in which the process can be executed. Furthermore, we found that the minimal number
of agents depends on the speciﬁc scenario and, for each scenario, we also obtained the assignments of agents to roles that
allow them to complete the process.
As far as computational aspects of our approach are concerned, we herewith brieﬂy mention what are the CPU times that
CCalc spent for solving the three tasks of interest. On a Pentium IV 1.6 GHz machine with 3GB of RAM, CCalc takes from
30 to 50 seconds to ground the speciﬁcations in input and create the corresponding set of clauses. A satisfying assignment
is then found in negligible time by running a modern, e.g., minisat, SAT solver on φ.
6. A comparison between C and the SMV language
In this section we analyze the languages C and SMV, which are supported by CCalc and NuSMV respectively. The
comparison focuses on the ability of the two languages to manage changes and updates of the speciﬁcations.
Here we provide a very brief introduction of the SMV language focusing on the aspects that are relevant for our compar-
ison. A detail account of the language can be found in [31]. In an SMV speciﬁcation the system under design is represented
as a Kripke structure deﬁned by state variables and transitions. State variables are deﬁned using the keyword VAR and, for
the scope of our analysis, are boolean. We also consider input variables (deﬁned using the keyword IVAR) that are used to
represent values given as input to the system and are also used to label transitions. SMV supports two styles for declaring
transitions: the assignment style and the constraint style. The assignment style is based on assignments of initial and next
values of each variable using the keyword ASSIGN. (If no assignment is speciﬁed for a variable, then the value of the vari-
able evolves nondeterministically.) The constraint style allows to specify conditions over variable values on the initial states,
the states, and the transitions by using the constructs INIT, INVAR and TRANS, respectively. In our comparison we use the
constraint style as it is more ﬂexible. Moreover, speciﬁcations in assignment style can be easily rewritten as an equivalent
speciﬁcation in constraint style.
C and SMV differ in fundamental way. In C , if there is no cause for a fact, the fact can be neither true nor false (and
thus the formula corresponding to the speciﬁcation is unsatisﬁable). In SMV declared facts are exogenous. The different
semantics given to the facts declared has a considerable impact on the way a model can be speciﬁed to obtain the same
behavior in both languages. As an example consider a simple scenario (1) where an agent is granted the execution of a task
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2 exogenous potentialOwner,delegated,unassigned,
3 caused granted if potentialOwner,
4 caused granted if delegated,
5 caused ¬granted if unassigned.
Fig. 4. C speciﬁcation of scenario (1).
1 VAR
2 potentialOwner : boolean,
3 delegated : boolean,
4 unassigned : boolean,
5 granted : boolean,
6 INVAR potentialOwner → granted,
7 INVAR delegated → granted,
8 INVAR unassigned →!granted,
9 INVAR potentialOwner|delegated|unassigned.
Fig. 5. SMV speciﬁcation of scenario (1).
1 simpleFluent potentialOwner,delegated,unassigned,granted,
2 exogenous potentialOwner,delegated,unassigned,
3 exogenousAction disable,
4 caused granted if potentialOwner,
5 caused granted if delegated,
6 caused ¬granted if unassigned,
7 disable causes ¬granted.
Fig. 6. C speciﬁcation of scenario (2).
1 VAR
2 potentialOwner : boolean,
3 delegated : boolean,
4 unassigned : boolean,
5 granted : boolean,
6 IVAR
7 disable : boolean,
8 INVAR potentialOwner → granted,
9 INVAR delegated → granted,
10 INVAR unassigned →!granted,
11 TRANS disable→ next(granted) = 0,
12 INVAR !(potentialOwner|delegated|unassigned) → disable.
Fig. 7. SMV speciﬁcation of scenario (2).
if she is a potential owner of the task (potentialOwner) or delegated to perform it (delegated), while she is not granted the
execution if she is not authorized to execute it (unassigned).
This scenario can be described in C by the speciﬁcation in Fig. 4 where either potentialOwner, or delegated, or unassigned
have to hold in order to provide a cause for granted to be either true or false. To specify the same behavior in SMV it
is necessary to explicitly state the dependencies that exist between the facts potentialOwner, delegated, and unassigned as
they all determine the value of granted as shown in Fig. 5. A straightforward consequence is that while modiﬁcations to the
C speciﬁcation of Fig. 4 can be done incrementally, this is not the case for the SMV speciﬁcation. As an example we can
imagine to extend the previous scenario by introducing a mechanism that according to some conditions (abstracted away
in our example) disables an agent, i.e. prevents the execution of tasks, namely a scenario (2). In C this can be speciﬁed as
shown in Fig. 6 by adding to the speciﬁcation in Fig. 4 an action disable that causes granted to be false, i.e. incrementally
adding the lines 3 and 7 in Fig. 6. In SMV this new scenario can be expressed as shown in Fig. 7. It is clear that the SMV
speciﬁcation is not incremental and the fact that the action disable is executed if neither potentialOwner, delegated, nor
unassigned hold must be explicit (line 12 of Fig. 7).
Many behaviors that can be obtained implicitly in C speciﬁcations must be made explicit in SMV. As a further example
consider a scenario (3) where agents are not granted the execution of tasks by default unless they are assigned this duty by,
e.g., an administrator, or they are delegated. This scenario can be speciﬁed in C as shown in Fig. 8. In this example, assigned
is exogenous while granted has a negative default value unless assigned or delegate cause it to be true. This behavior can be
speciﬁed in SMV as in Fig. 9 by explicitly stating when the value of granted is negative (line 8 in Fig. 9). Imagine that we
now want to modify the scenario by allowing an agent granted the execution of a task to retain this authorization, namely
a scenario (4). In C this can be simply done by incrementally adding inertial granted to the speciﬁcation in Fig. 8. The
main difference of the new speciﬁcation is that after granted has become true, either because delegate has been executed or
assigned was true, it can retain the true value other than become false because of the default. To apply the same modiﬁcation
in SMV the speciﬁcation changes considerably in the way granted is speciﬁed (lines 8 and 9 in Fig. 10).
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2 exogenous assigned,
3 default ¬granted,
4 exogenousAction delegate,
5 caused granted if assigned,
6 delegate causes granted.
Fig. 8. SMV speciﬁcation of scenario (3).
1 VAR
2 granted : boolean,
3 assigned : boolean,
4 IVAR
5 delegate : boolean,
6 INVAR assigned → granted,
7 TRANS delegate → next(granted) = 1,
8 TRANS !assigned & !delegate → !granted.
Fig. 9. C speciﬁcation of scenario (3).
1 VAR
2 granted : boolean,
3 assigned : boolean,
4 IVAR
5 delegate : boolean,
6 INVAR assigned → granted,
7 TRANS delegate → next(granted) = 1,
8 TRANS granted → next(granted) = 1|next(granted) = 0,
9 TRANS !granted & !assigned & !delegate →!granted.
Fig. 10. SMV speciﬁcation of scenario (4).
Similar scenarios occur also in the LOP case study presented in Section 2. As an example we can consider the speciﬁca-
tion of the authorization to execute task extRating with respect to delegation. In this case it is again possible to observe that
SMV requires to explicitly state all the mechanism which can be left implicit in C . In particular, in the C speciﬁcation pre-
sented in Section 4, delegated(a, r, t) prevents the authorization to execute to be denied when an agent is delegated. More
in detail, delegated(a, r, t) is an inertial fact which is set to true after D1 is executed and has a false default value through
the unless abbreviation in (11), and thus its behavior resembles the one of speciﬁcation in Fig. 8 after the modiﬁcation
according to the scenario (4). As a consequence, its translation in SMV recalls the speciﬁcation in Fig. 10. Notice that SMV
is a propositional language and thus each C predicate has to be speciﬁed for each ground instance, e.g.
INIT !delegated(pierSilvio,pierPaolo, supervisor, extRating);
TRANS d1_pierSilvio_pierPaolo_supervisor_extRating →
next(delegated_pierSilvio_pierPaolo_supervisor_extRating) = 1;
TRANS delegated_pierSilvio_pierPaolo_supervisor_extRating →
next(delegated_pierSilvio_pierPaolo_supervisor_extRating) = 1|
next(delegated_pierSilvio_pierPaolo_supervisor_extRating) = 0;
TRANS !delegated_pierSilvio_pierPaolo_supervisor_extRating &
!d1_pierSilvio_pierPaolo_supervisor_extRating →
next(delegated_pierSilvio_pierPaolo_supervisor_extRating) = 0;
where the ground predicates, e.g. delegated(pierSilvio,pierPaolo, supervisor, extRating), stand for the corresponding proposi-
tional letters.
7. Related work
A preliminary version of this work is [1]. Here we have signiﬁcantly extended [1] by providing: (i) a mapping from
elementary net and security policy into C , which also clearly shows how the speciﬁcation of the workﬂow and the security
policy can be kept separate; (ii) an extended experimental analysis; (iii) a comparison between C and SMV, which highlights
some of the main features of the language C; (iv) an exhaustive analysis of the related works that covers all main aspects
of our work; and (v) a detailed description of the reasoning tasks we analyze.
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Action languages [11] serve for describing changes that are caused by performing actions. As predecessor of C , action
language A, i.e., the propositional fragment of ADL, was presented in [32] to enhance the expressive power of the STRIPS
planning language [33] by allowing conditional effects. Action language B extended A with static laws. In action language
C nondeterministic actions and the concurrent execution of actions are more conveniently described than in B.4 Moreover,
with C we are free to decide for each ﬂuent whether or not to postulate inertia for it. Given it is based on the theory of
causal explanation proposed in [35], C distinguishes between asserting that a fact “simply” holds, and the stronger assertion
that “it is caused”. C+ [28] further extended C by allowing ﬂuents to be multi-valued, other than some other (minor)
changes. The language C+ has been then extended in several directions, e.g., to include “additive ﬂuents” [36], to represent
numeric-valued ﬂuents [37] and to include the possibility of referring to other action descriptions in the deﬁnition of a new
action domain [38]. The applicability of action language C/C+ spans from the representation of “classical” AI problems [39],
to planning [40], multi-agent domains [41] and robotics [42], coupled with the reasoning capabilities of CCalc. C has been
also used as “basic language” to compare [43] and update [44] action domain descriptions. As far as other knowledge
representation languages are concerned, we herewith mention three more languages. The language K [10] is a declarative
planning language based on principles and methods of logic programming. Its distinguished feature is that K describes
transitions between “states of knowledge” rather than between “states of the world” used in language C/C+. Like C/C+,
it uses a notion of causation. Correspondences between (fragments of) K and C are presented in the mentioned paper.
Temporal Action Logics Language TAL [12] uses a surface language L(ND) (Narrative Description Language) to provide a
high-level notation of “narratives”, i.e., collections of statements. There is the possibility to describe both the static and
dynamic aspects of a narrative. A narrative described in L(ND) is translated, after some steps, into a logically equivalent
ﬁrst order theory. Dedicated algorithms are then used to reason about narratives. Finally, in [45] Concurrent Transaction
Logic (CT R) is proposed, and used as a language for specifying, analyzing and scheduling of workﬂows.
Action language C and system CCalc have been already used in the context of business processes [46,47]. In [46] the
research objective is to describe, simulate, compose, verify, and develop Web services. However, this work does not consider
(complex) security policies to be modeled or veriﬁed. On the contrary, our approach takes into account security policies and
focuses on modeling and reasoning about business processes with the objectives of verifying security properties, synthetiz-
ing policies, and ﬁnding resource allocation plans. In [47] the author considers activities with duration and the cost of a
workﬂow execution but, differently from our approach, he does not take into account complex security policies (i.e., agents
are statically assigned to tasks) and mandatory requirements, e.g., SoD. This means that it does not consider delegations
either. The model is simpler than the one we consider, e.g., indirect effects are not considered.
7.2. Automatic veriﬁcation of business processes under authorization constraints
The use of model checking for the automatic analysis of business processes has been put forward and investigated in [5].
The paper shows that business processes with RBAC policies and delegation can be formally speciﬁed as transition systems
and that SoD properties can be formally expressed as Linear Temporal Logic formulas specifying the allowed behaviors
of the transition systems. The viability of the approach is shown through its application to a version of the LOP and the
NuSMV [24] model checker is used to carry out the veriﬁcation. However the LOP version considered in [5] is much simpler
and does not feature many of the aspects we consider, as already underlined in Section 5.1. Our approach, by using an
action language, allows for a more natural and concise modeling of the business process and of the associated security
policy. Moreover, our approach allows for the separate speciﬁcation of the workﬂow and of the security policy while this
is not the case for the approach presented in [5], where even small changes in the workﬂow or in the security policy
may affect the speciﬁcation of the whole transition system. Our approach therefore considerably simpliﬁes the speciﬁcation
process, thereby reducing the probability of introducing bugs in the speciﬁcation.
A formal framework that uses the SAL model checker [48] to analyze SoD properties as well as to synthesize a resource
allocation plan for a business process has been presented in [6]. However, differently from our approach, this framework
does not offer a natural modeling and RBAC is the only access control model supported (with tasks rigidly associated with
speciﬁc roles). Moreover, this work does not take into account the global state of the process and assumes an interleaving
semantics. This is not the case in our approach as it accounts for a global state that can be affected by the execution of the
tasks as well as for multiple actions to be executed simultaneously.
An approach to the combined modeling of business workﬂows with RBAC models is presented in [7]. The paper proposes
an extended ﬁnite state machine model that allows for the model checking of SoD properties by using the model checker
SPIN [49]. It considers a simple RBAC model only based on previous activation (or non-activation) of roles and it does not
take into account delegation. A number of techniques to alleviate the state explosion problem are presented.
Some computational techniques for analyzing SoD by integrating workﬂows of the enterprise processes into the RBAC
framework is presented in [21]. It proposes an algorithm for generating mutually exclusive roles (MER) to enforce SoD and
veriﬁcation algorithms to check if a role authorization together with a user-role assignment satisfy static and dynamic SoD
4 In [34] it is presented an alternative extension of the language A to enable concurrent execution of actions.
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to satisfy the SoD constraints. However the approach does not allow for the separate speciﬁcation of the workﬂow and
the security policy as the workﬂow in input to the algorithms captures aspects related to the policy, e.g. a conditional
permission assignment has to be captured by duplicating the task and adding an if condition to the workﬂow structure.
Moreover it does not consider hierarchy of roles that by allowing senior roles to perform tasks assigned to junior roles
would considerably affect the proposed approach. Also notice that MER is a way to enforce a subset of SoD that, e.g.,
is not suﬃcient for the kind of SoD constraints we consider in our work. Finally, [21] does not consider the problem of
synthesizing the permission assignment relation while this is the case in our approach.
The paper [22] proposes to model workﬂows and security policies in a notation based on Colored Petri nets, with an
automatic translation from the process model into a speciﬁcation language and the usage of SPIN to verify SoD properties.
However, no provision is made for the assignment of an agent to multiple roles, role hierarchy, delegation, and the global
state of the process.
Other approaches that use (Colored) Petri nets in this context are [50,51]. The ﬁrst paper introduced a model for SoD
in workﬂows that are speciﬁed with Petri nets, and allows for simulating and analyzing workﬂows and security rules at
build time; rules are given as facts of a logic program and expressed in propositional logic. However it does not take
into account, e.g., role hierarchy or conditions in the permission assignment and the reasoning task of synthesizing the
permission assignment. [51], which is much more recent than [50], presents a formal technique to model and analyze
RBAC using Colored Petri nets (CP-nets). The resulting CP-net model can be composed with context-speciﬁc aspects of the
application of interest, e.g. the workﬂow, however the approach focuses on the access control policy and does not allow
for the separate speciﬁcation of the workﬂow and the access control policy in a modular way. Moreover the use of CP-nets
does not allow the use of advanced features as, e.g., implicit preconditions of tasks. A graphical representation of the CP-nets
models can be provided by using CPN tools.5 However the approach does consider the problems of synthesizing permission
assignments and resource allocation plans.
A security validation approach for business processes that employs state-of-the-art model checking techniques and makes
them usable by business analysts is presented in [52]. The paper considers business processes expressed in BPMN enhanced
with an application-dependent security policy, e.g. delegation of tasks, agent substitution, and fully automates their transla-
tion into a formal model suitable to formal analysis while offering graphical user interfaces to deﬁne security properties and
easy-to-understand feedback for the business analysts. However the approach does not consider some business processes
features which are relevant for an accurate security analysis, e.g., nondeterministic, indirect and conditional effects of tasks.
This is due to the fact that these aspects are not directly available in the industrially suited languages, as BPMN, as their
focus is on the deﬁnition of the procedural behavior of the process, e.g. they deﬁne as output of a task all the data that
can be affected but they do not specify how and when their values can be affected. It would thus be of great interest to
(i) evaluate extensions to the languages used in the industrial environments in order to support the declarative speciﬁcation
of advanced, relevant features and (ii) automate the process of transformation of the extended languages into C . As an
example, BPMN could be enhanced with annotations supporting a declarative, C-like speciﬁcation of, e.g., nondeterministic,
indirect and conditional effects of tasks. The resulting model could then be automatically translated into a C speciﬁcation
as the one presented in Section 4. Notice that the automation of the translation would make it language- and application-
dependent, e.g. [52] relies on BPMN and the industrial environment SAP Netweaver BPM [53]. We leave these research
directions for future work.
7.3. Frameworks for security policies
An approach based on model checking for the analysis and synthesis of complex security policies is presented in [19]
and further developed in [20]. In particular, they consider ﬁne-grained policies where permissions are the ability of agents
to access resources to read or write. They propose the RW (Read and Write) access control formalism based on propositional
logic and deﬁne a machine-readable language to express policies modelled in the RW formalism and properties to be veriﬁed
against the model. The RW model checking algorithm and a related tool which implements the algorithm are presented.
The proposed framework is expressive and allows for the speciﬁcation of administrative policies either. However, there is no
way to express mutual exclusions between the values of different variables, e.g., it is not possible to express a rule of the
form “an agent cannot be a student and a lecturer at the same time”, and there is no way to express inheritance between
roles. Moreover, such works do not take into account the natural interactions between the workﬂow and the security policy
while this is the case in our approach.
In [54–57] rule-based policy speciﬁcations are presented and evaluated. In particular, [57] ﬁrst presents a broad view of
different policy languages, and then a system for specifying and enforcing security and private policy, called Protune [56].
However the focus of these works is on policies languages and enforcement from a run-time point of view, usually in the
context of the Semantic Web, i.e., they evaluate the existing languages and propose a system for specifying and cooperatively
enforcing security and privacy policies in open environments such as the Web, where parties may get in touch without being
previously known to each other. On the contrary our work focuses on security policies in the context of business processes
5 See, e.g., http://wiki.daimi.au.dk/cpntools/cpntools.wiki.
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of the system.
8. Conclusions
The design and veriﬁcation of business processes under authorization constraints is a time consuming and error-prone
activity. Moreover, due to the complexity that business processes subject to a security policy may reach, it can be diﬃcult
to verify even basic properties such as the executability of the process w.r.t. the available resources by manual inspection
only, or by simulation.
In this paper we have presented an action-based approach to the formal speciﬁcation and automatic analysis of business
processes under authorization constraints. With our approach we have been able to both greatly simplify the speciﬁcation
activity, and allow for the separate speciﬁcation of the workﬂow and of the associated security policy, while retaining the
ability to perform a fully automatic analysis of the speciﬁcations by using the Causal Calculator CCalc. The experiments
we have presented indicate that our approach can be proﬁtably used to execute a number of reasoning tasks particularly
important from the application viewpoint, such as verify the process executability, synthesize a permission assignment and
identify resource allocation plans complying with the security policy.
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